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I Introduction 
Tax reform is a change in the status quo. It has been one of the major 
preoccupations of most developing countries in the 1980s. Over 100 attempts 
at tax reforms in developing countries have been recorded since 1945. Tax 
reform has turned from a desired or preferred task to being a necessary one 
(Gillis, 1989a). One of the victims of numerous economic crises that have 
plagued developing countries since the first oil shock in 1973 has been the tax 
system. Consequently, tax collections have been hit hard resulting in large 
fiscal deficits. Unfortunately, in the 1980s external finances with which to 
finance fiscal deficits were not forthcoming, developing countries were left 
with no option but to print more money to finance deficits, with consequent 
double-digit inflation. 
Most developing countries suffer from over-dependence on a small number 
of sources of tax revenue which are vulnerable to external events, which 
remains a crucial problem in their tax system. These sources include import 
and export taxes on mineral products, the prices of which are determined on 
world markets, and tend to be volatile. These taxes constitute a major source 
of revenue in many developing countries. 
The above problems have created the need for many developing countries 
to undertake tax reforms during the 1980s. Most of these reforms, however, 
have been on tax structure, with the general objectives of revenue adequacy, 
economic efficiency, equity and fairness, and simplicity. It is pertinent to point 
out that even if the reform is compatible with the macroeconomic objectives 
of the government, there is little chance of success if it either cannot be 
administered, or administrative reforms cannot be undertaken. Many tax 
reforms carried out in developing countries have been on tax structure rather 
than on tax administration. 
Over the last 28 years of independence, the tax system in Tanzania has 
undergone fundamental reform in response to the need for economic and social 
development. While a series of basic tax reforms have been undertaken, 
particularly since the fiscal year 1969/70, the central government has failed 
massively to generate sufficient tax revenue to meet the current needs for 
government services. The tax burden, measured by the ratio of tax to GDP, has 
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averaged around 21.6% over the 1979/89 period (Appendix Table 1). The tax 
ratio has exhibited a zero trend over the 1979/84 period. However, the period 
after 1984 registered an increasing trend, suggesting that reforms have 
increased the tax burden over the period. Although Tanzania's tax to GDP 
ratio is higher than that of Eastern Asian countries, it is far below that of 
OECD countries1 (Appendix Tables 2 and 3). 
This apparent failure of the tax system to generate sufficient revenue has led 
to the government running increasingly huge deficits in both the current and 
overall government budget, particularly since the fiscal year 1978/9. 
Consequently, bank borrowing and external finance were sought as temporary 
measures to finance the deficits. Since these two Sources of deficit financing 
are not suitable in the medium and long terms, efforts must be made to design 
a tax system that is viable and able to support government services without 
recourse to printing money and seeking external funds. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the revenue productivity 
implications of tax reform in Tanzania, focusing it as a way of raising the 
productivity of the tax system. Specific objectives are: (1) to analyze the 
productivity performance of the tax system and individual major taxes, which 
will entail the analysis of tax elasticity at two levels, base-to-income elasticity 
and tax-to-base elasticity; and (2) to link the tax exemption analysis with the 
discussion and empirical estimation of tax elasticities. In particular, the 
objective is to assess the impact of exemptions on elasticities. 
Section II summarizes the theoretical discussion on tax reform. Section III 
provides an overview of tax reform. Section IV discusses the revenue 
productivity of Tanzanian taxes and the overall tax system. The section 
provides a definition of buoyancy and elasticity, a discussion of techniques of 
measuring elasticity and buoyancy, and a survey of empirical results. Section 
V links tax exemption analysis to an empirical estimation of tax elasticities. 
Section VI provides the conclusions. 
II Conceptual framework 
Recent theory and issues in tax reform 
The literature on tax reform has been growing rapidly, suggesting the 
theoretical and practical importance of the subject. Much of the literature has 
been more descriptive than analytical. The techniques applied to evaluating 
success or failure of tax reforms are not well documented. Normally the 
analysis of tax reform has tended to focus on evaluating the objectives of those 
reforms: revenue adequacy, economic efficiency, equity, and simplicity. The 
need for tax reform arises from the deficiency of the existing tax system in 
achieving these objectives (McMahon and Berrios, 1991, p.5). 
Revenue adequacy is the basic elementary standard that a tax system ought 
to achieve. The existing budget deficits in many developing countries suggest 
that the tax systems are not revenue productive. Some may overlook this and 
attribute the cause of deficits to excessive spending, or temporarily adverse 
economic conditions. In situations where budget deficits persist for a long 
period, one has to ask whether increased revenue should not be the main 
objective of tax reform. The answer is bound to depend on the circumstances 
of each country. Certainly, few, if any, developing countries can afford to 
adopt tax reforms, no matter how desirable they might be on other grounds, 
if they lead to substantial revenue losses. Goode (1987) argues that it is hard 
to gain serious consideration for any revenue-neutral reform proposal. By and 
large, in Africa most finance ministers consider revenue gain as the primary 
motive for tax reform. 
Optimal tax theory still has a significant influence on academic research in 
tax reform. This approach is used by Newberry and Stern (1987) who apply 
a normative framework to analyze the tax reform process. The optimal taxation 
approach emphasizes the need to analyze the impact of tax reform and evaluate 
both its administrative costs and its effect on social welfare. This framework 
has been criticized for its inability to identify the real practical needs of tax 
reform in developing countries. Its first major shortcoming is that it requires 
substantial data which are scarce or non-existent in many developing countries. 
Second, optimal taxation has assumed the existence of perfect administration. 
However, the recent reform experiences have revealed a serious lack of 
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administration capacity in virtually all developing countries, showing the need 
for simpler administrative structures. The impact of optimal taxation on tax 
reform in developing countries has been small and indirect (Gillis, 1989b, 
p. 515) because of this deficiency. In addition, under the optimal taxation 
approach the analysis of revenue productivity of a tax would be of less 
significance. 
Trends in tax reform in the 1980s 
As already pointed out, the 1980s was an important period for tax reforms 
worldwide, from which clear patterns are observable. Significant elements of 
these trends have included the introduction of a uniform rate value-added tax 
system (VAT) as a standard model of commodity taxation, a change in the 
direction of broader personal and corporate income tax bases; more emphasis 
on improving tax administration, and more indication of the income tax 
system. As regards income taxation, the inclination has been to broaden the tax 
base to reduce the tax rates, both of which bring about important effects on the 
efficiency of the system and on vertical equity. Buchanan (1987) argues that 
for some taxpayers the rate reductions do not fully offset the greater revenue 
raised by broadening the tax base. Despite the reduction in their excess burden, 
they will suffer net utility losses. 
Income taxation, as the main instrument to achieve the goal of vertical 
equity, seems to have been declining in importance. The combination of 
base-broadening and higher tax revenues from tax reform appears to be far 
more effective tools for meeting equity goals. Base-broadening clearly 
contributes to redistribution because income excluded from taxation is largely 
received by high-income families. The role of high tax revenues in income 
redistribution deserves special comment. Studies of the impact of the budget 
on income distribution, in the US, Columbia, Malaysia and Chile, strongly 
indicate that if the budget is to serve redistributive purposes effectively, the 
primary emphasis must be placed upon the expenditure, not the tax, side of the 
budget.2 In brief, the incidence studies suggest that the expenditure side of the 
Indonesian budget has been a much more effective means of shifting income 
and services to the poor than the tax side (Gillis, 1985, p. 235). 
In the area of commodity taxation, there has been a trend to replace the 
turnover sales taxes by value-added taxes. In Musgrave's opinion, these trends 
have certain implications: a change in the perception of income tax as the main 
instrument of progressive taxation; an increasing acceptance of consumption 
as the tax base; and the emergence of VAT as the appropriate means for 
income tax reform (Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah, 1990, Ch. 18, pp. 4-5). 
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These changes in approach followed an academic preference for consumption 
as the tax base. Musgrave argues that important factors in promoting this 
process were the complexities of direct taxation, distortions introduced by 
incentive effects, and the shifting political attitude towards equity (McMahon 
and Berrios, 1991, p.7). 
Reform of tax administration 
A single obvious conclusion which the recent tax reform has demonstrated has 
been the need for a simple and manageable tax system. Ironically, justice has 
not been done to tax administration in the literature on the subject (McMahon 
and Berrios, 1991, p. 7). 
The 1980s have shown the importance of the administrative limUs of tax 
systems in developing countries. A sharp contrast can be seen between the real 
conditions for implementing tax systems and the degree of complexity with 
which the structures have been designed. Advisers of the administration should 
stress the need for clear and simple tax structures and real administrative 
capacity to implement them. 
Bird (1990, pp. 1-20) identifies three different approaches to reforms of tax 
structures and tax administration: first, the reform of tax structures, followed 
by administrative changes; second, administrative changes followed by reform 
of the tax structure; and the third approach considers administrative changes 
and reform of tax structures as being independent. The third approach is the 
commonly accepted view at present. 
Ill Overview of tax reform in Tanzania 
Introduction 
Tax reform raises four basic questions: why do it? when should it be done? in 
what direction should it go? how should it be implemented? The brief 
discussion of tax reform in Tanzania presented below is carried out in the 
context of these questions. Tanzania has undertaken important reforms in its 
tax system over the past three decades. The objectives of these reforms have 
largely been base-broadening, rate-increasing, rate-reducing, introducing new 
taxes, abolishing certain taxes, simplifying the tax system and providing fiscal 
incentives. 
Tax reform in the 1960s 
The 1960s, characterized by the absence of economic hardships and crises, 
experienced very few tax reforms, the only one undertaken being the 
introduction of the Sales Tax Act of 1969. This was introduced partly to offset 
the decline in import duty revenues caused by the growth of import 
substitution industries, and partly due to reduced rural taxation (Budget 
Speech, 1969/70, pp. 21-22). Above all, the basic objective of the reform was 
revenue. 
Tax reform in the 1970s 
The economic atmosphere changed in the 1970s. The 1973/74 period saw the 
first oil price shock, followed by the extensive drought of 1974/75, both of 
which had a great impact on the production of food and traditional exports. 
Added to these catastrophes was the war with Uganda in 1978/79 which took 
a indeterminable financial and social toll, officially estimated at US$500 
million. The situation was further aggravated by the intensification of the 
Southern Africa struggle, the second oil price shock wave of 1978, coupled 
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with a deterioration in agricultural export performance in the wake of drought 
and floods during the latter part of 1979. Over the entire decade, the only good 
years were 1976 and 1977 when the country enjoyed the coffee boom. Since 
1978, the country has been running huge deficits on both current and overall 
government budgets. 
Tax reform in the 1970s aimed mainly at revenue generation to meet the 
rapid increase in government current expenditures. To achieve this major 
objective, tax reform focused on base-broadening and rate-increasing. Another 
reform objective was equity. Other non-revenue objectives of tax reform like 
efficiency, simplicity, and promotion of domestic investment or production, 
received very little attention from the reform package. 
The 1970s reform gave birth to the Income Tax Act of 1973. Prior to 1973, 
income tax in East Africa was administered by the East African Income Tax 
Department. Negotiations had been going on during 1971-72 between Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania and the Eastern African Community on how to improve 
income tax collection in a manner equitable to the three countries. 
Subsequently, it was considered appropriate to place the responsibility of 
income tax in the hands of each national government. This was based on two 
factors. First, the partner states had been pursuing diverse policies since 
independence, and second, there were management problems in collecting 
income tax (Budget Speech, 1973/74). 
In response, income tax in Tanzania was reorganized under the Income Tax 
Act 1973, which was one of the country's major tax reforms. The major 
objectives of the Act were: (1) to amalgamate the old personal income tax and 
surtaxes into a single individual income tax; (2) to abolish the single, married 
and child allowances; (3) to make income tax more progressive; (4) to reduce 
income inequality; and (5) to generate revenue to finance the rapidly 
expanding expenditure level. Nevertheless, the thrust of the reform was on 
objectives (3), (4) and" (5) (Osoro, 1985). Once again, the simplicity objective 
did not feature at all. 
The 1973 Act made tax rates more progressive than the previous ones 
(Budget Speech, 1973/74). The marginal rates ranged from 20 to 95%. Married 
and child allowances were eliminated on the ground that these allowances had 
previously applied only to high-income earners who constituted a minor 
portion of the total labour force in the economy. Ironically, similar allowances 
were re-introduced in 1978, though with minor modifications.3 The married 
and child allowances were re-introduced as a government response to the 
arguments which ensued in the National Assembly in 1978 which claimed that 
married taxpayers bringing up children bore a heavier responsibility than those 
without families (Budget Speech, 1978/79). Were such considerations not 
important when similar allowances were abolished in 1973? 
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Other major tax reforms undertaken in the 1970s were in the area of excise 
duty and sales tax. In 1976 the 1969 Sales Tax Act was repealed and replaced 
by the 1976 Sales Tax Act.4 The new Act provided for base-broadening and 
rate-increasing to generate more revenue. It has been argued in some official 
reports that the reform made sales tax less progressive. Excise duty on beer 
and cigarettes was abolished in the fiscal year 1978/79, and finally abolished 
on all previously excisable .goods in the fiscal year 1979/80. The outcome of 
this measure was a substantial rise in sales tax rates to offset the resulting 
revenue loss and a further complication of the sales tax structure. 
The final major tax reform was the raising of company tax rates from 45 
to 50% and from 50 to 55% for resident and non-resident companies 
respectively in 1976. Like other tax reforms in the 1970s, the objective was 
revenue generation. 
To reiterate, the motive behind tax reform in the 1970s was to enhance 
revenue generation and to introduce the consideration of equity. However, the 
reform generated complexities in the tax system in both the rate structure of 
import duties and sales tax at the end of the decade. 
Tax reform in the 1980s 
The early years of the 1980s, like the mid-1970s, were characterized by 
drought. The country recorded huge deficits in the fiscal budget and in the 
balance-of-payments account. Foreign funds needed to reduce these deficits 
were not forthcoming. The crisis intensified when government attempts to 
negotiate with the IMF failed. Thus, the Government had no option but to rely 
on domestic resources: the major domestic source of deficit financing was 
through the government borrowing and running the printing press. In the case 
of the balance-of-payments deficits, trade restrictions and exchange control 
measures were enforced by the government to limit imports of foreign goods. 
The tax reforms before 1985 aimed at raising rates of import duties and 
sales tax with a view to raising revenue: import duty rates were as high as 
1,100%. 
These reforms led to complicated tax structures. In 1969, there were no 
more than five ad valorem and half-a-dozen specific rates of sales tax, but by 
the early 1980s the rates had increased to over 25 of each, some of which were 
most odd and inconvenient. 
From 1984 onwards the country's policies changed direction. In 1984 trade 
liberalization was introduced. Negotiations with the IMF were concluded in 
1986 paving the way for an inflow of foreign resources into the country. The 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was launched in the same year. These 
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developments generated a new look at tax policy. Several studies on the tax 
system were undertaken by the World Bank, the IMF, and local tax experts for 
the government. .Most of these studies recommended, among other things, the 
simplification and rationalization of the major taxes through the reduction of 
rates and rate categories with a view to improving compliance and tax 
administration. These studies were, however, undertaken at the behest of the 
World Bank and the IMF. 
In 1985 all export taxes were abolished, in order to reduce the tax burden 
and give incentives to exporters. In addition, the measure was expected to 
enable the country to sell its exports at competitive prices (Budget Speech, 
1985/86). In the same year, the Sales Tax Act was amended and the Registered 
Dealers Certificate (RDC) was introduced, p. 30). A road toll was also 
introduced in 1985. From 1985, import duty and sales tax rates were gradually 
reduced each year. Nevertheless, a more significant rate reduction and 
rationalization occurred in 1988 and 1990 with respect to import duty and sales 
tax, respectively. Excise duty was re-introduced in 1989 to facilitate 
rationalization and simplification of sales tax structure and administration. 
In the area of income taxation, marginal tax rates were reduced from a 
range of 20-95% to 15-75% in 1986/87, to a range of 15-55% in 1986, further 
to a range of 10-50% in 1989, and finally to a range of 7.5-40% in 1990. 
These rate reductions were aimed at enhancing the take-home pay of a worker 
whose real income had been declining throughout the decade. 
Summary 
It should now be evident that tax reform in Tanzania during the past three 
decades has largely focused on increasing revenue rather than improving 
efficiency. The target of simplifying the system was set during the second half 
of the 1980s; recognition of the importance of reforming the administration has 
emerged recently. In Tanzania, tax reform has been used as an instrument of 
raising revenue productivity. This is the thrust of the analysis of the rest of this 
paper.' The next section analyses the revenue productivity of the tax system. 
IV Revenue productivity of the Tanzanian 
tax system 
Definition of elasticity of buoyancy 
One criterion of a good tax system is high revenue productivity (Asher, 1989b, 
p. 12). The common measures of such productivity are buoyancy and elasticity. 
Two factors can give rise to growth in tax revenues: (1) the rules or rates 
of tax can be changed to raise more revenue from the same base: or (2) the 
base on which the tax is imposed may grow. The growth of tax in response to 
GDP can therefore be broken down into two components: the automatic 
growth as the base on which the tax is charged grows in relation to GDP, and 
the growth resulting from discretionary changes in tax rates and rules. The 
combined effect is known as the buoyancy of a tax. A buoyancy coefficient of 
1.6 would imply that for every 1% increase in GDP, revenue from the tax had, 
on average, grown by 1.6%. The effect of automatic growth alone, abstracting 
from discretionary changes, is known as the elasticity of tax. Accordingly, an 
elasticity coefficient of 1.6 would imply that for every 1% increase in GDP, 
revenue from the tax would have grown by 1.6% if the rules and rates of the 
tax had remained unchanged. 
It is, by and large, desirable that the revenue growth of a tax keeps pace 
with that of GDP without frequent discretionary changes having to be made 
to its rates and structure. This requires that the tax elasticity coefficient be 
equal to, or exceed, one. 
It is conventional to give the elasticity of a tax revenue in relation to 
income in aggregate models as a single number, but it is seen more 
appropriately as the weighted average of the elasticities of separate taxes which 
usually differ widely in response to changes in income. Thus, overall tax 
elasticities should be measured by analysing the elasticities of individual taxes 
separately. For analytical purposes it is important to break down the income 
elasticity of each separate tax into two elements: the elasticity of the tax to the 
base, and the elasticity of the base to income. In symbols, these elasticities are 
defined (Mansfield, 1972, pp.426-7) as follows: 
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a) Elasticity of total tax revenue to income, 
A T Y ET, = — 1 x _ 
T' AY Tt 
b) Elasticity of Ath individual tax to income, 
E = A 7 * x Y 
v ~AYXTk 
c) Elasticity of kth individual tax to base, 
AT; B. ET B. = i x ' Tk 
d) Elasticity of Ath individual base to income, 
ABk Y EB, = — 1 x 
Bl AY Bk 
Where Tt is total tax revenue, Tk is tax revenue from Mi tax, Y is income 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP), Bk is the base of kth tax, and A 
is the discrete change in the variable associated with it. 
Given these definitions of elasticity, it follows that in a system of n taxes: 
(1) 
-r = TJ TT (ATl / AY . Y / T X ) + 
Tk / Tt(ATk /AY . Y Y / Tk)+ ... 
T I T (AT / AY x Y / T) rt I v n it' 
Expression (1) states that the elasticity of total tax revenue to income is equal 
to the weighted sum of the individual tax elasticities (where the weights are 
the fractional distribution to total tax by each individual tax). In addition, as 
stated in expression (2), the elasticity of any separate tax may be broken down 
into the product of elasticity of the tax to its base and the elasticity of base to 
income. 
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(2) ET, (ATK / ABKXBJ TK) (ABK! AY .Y ! BK) 
Finally, using (1) and (2), elasticity of total tax revenue to income in a system 
of n taxes depends on the product of the elasticity of tax-to-base and 
base-to-income elasticity fpr each separate tax, weighted by the importance of 
that tax in the total system. 
This analysis of the income elasticity of the tax system has two advantages. 
First, it permits identification of the sources of fast revenue growth and, 
conversely, the sources of lagging revenue growth. For example, a high value 
elasticity (greater than unity) would reflect fast revenue growth, while a low 
value (less than unity) would imply lagging revenue growth. Second, equation 
(3) allows identification of that part of growth which policy makers can control 
(Mansfield, p. 427). 
Techniques for estimating tax elasticities 
Tax buoyancy measures the responsiveness of tax revenue to changes in 
income or output with no attempt to control for discretionary changes in tax 
policy. The traditional way to estimate the elasticity of a particular tax, k, is 
with the following model: 
(3) + 
ET, = TJTT [(ATL/ABL . BJTX) (AB/AF, . Y/BJ] + ... 
TK / T( [(ATK / ABK.BJ TK) (ABJ / AY . Y / BK)] 
- ... T / T [(AT / AB . B / T) (AB / AY . Y / B )] It t Lv n n n n' v n n/J 
(4) TK = A « k 
Logarithmic transformation gives 
(5) In TK = In AK + In Y + U, k 
Where T is tax revenue, Y is GDP, and u is a stochastic disturbance term. 
Ordinary least square is used to estimate the coefficients a and p. Since the 
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equation is in double log form, it provides an estimate of tax buoyancy 
because it measures the percentage response in the left-hand side variable. 
Income elasticity is, however, rather difficult to measure, as it requires an 
estimate of what would have happened if changes to the tax structure had not 
been made. Thus, estimating tax elasticity involves modifying the above model 
to account for discretionary changes in tax policy. A variety of factors can 
cause tax revenue to change: discretionary changes in tax base and rates; the 
efficiency of tax administration; introduction of new taxes, and abolition of 
other taxes, etc. In order to estimate income elasticity, historical tax revenue 
series ought to be adjusted to eliminate the effects on tax revenue of all factors 
other than GDP. 
One technique for cleansing the revenue series of discretionary effects is 
that of proportional adjustment. This technique identifies a revenue yield based 
on rates and exemptions in one reference year, taken in this study as the first 
year, as part of an annual adjustment over a longer period. A sequence of 
multiplicative factors is used to measure the revenue impact of discretionary 
changes in each year, and adjustments are then made according to the impact 
of those changes. Thus, if actual collections in year t are 1,000, but 
discretionary changes in year t account for 150 of that 1,000, so that at tax rate 
of year tA, revenue would have been 850, revenues in year t are multiplied by 
850/1000, scaling down by 15% to what they would have been without the 
discretionary changes of year t. A series of revenue based on the tax structure 
of the first year can be derived using a series of multiplicative factors.5 The 
formula is as follows: 
T T T J, j-l.j-l 2,3 1,2 
j ' t "' T ' f J 1 2 
where 
Tj denotes the actual yield in the ;th year 
TX J denotes the collection of the y'th year adjusted to the structure 
of the ith year chosen as the reference or base year, and 
TjAj = 7} - DJ where D- is the revenue effect (positive or negative) in the y'th 
year of the discretionary change in that year. 
The resulting series reflects only automatic changes in revenue resulting from 
the evolution of the size and distribution of the tax base, that is, what 
collections would have been if the 1979 structure had been in force throughout 
the sample period. 
(6) hi 
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The estimates of the revenue impact of discretionary changes are derived 
largely from the publication of annual budget speeches. All the information 
available has been used in these estimates, there is, however, no means of 
checking on their accuracy (Byrne, 1983, p. 135). Appendix Table 4 shows the 
revenue estimates of the impact of discretionary tax changes. 
Once the data have been subjected to the above method, the model (5) is 
estimated on the adjusted data: 
(?) log ATk = log a , + p t log Y + uk 
and a k provides an estimate of the elasticity of the Ath tax. 
A second method for estimating tax elasticity is the dummy variable 
technique developed by Singer (1968). This involves introducing a dummy 
variable into model (5) for each exogenous tax policy change. The revised 
model takes the form 
(8) log Tk = log y0k + y u log Y + I y 2 . D, + 
where the dummy variable D takes on the value 0 before the discretionary 
change, and 1 after the change. The summation accounts for the possibility of 
multiple changes during the period. In this model the coefficient y l k estimates 
the elasticity. In spite of the simplicity of this technique, its use in estimating 
elasticity becomes very limited when the number of discretionary changes is 
large relative to length of data period. 
A series of discretionary changes has taken place in Tanzania during the 
sample period (1979-89). This limits the use of the dummy variable technique 
in this study. For this reason, the proportional adjustment method was used to 
estimate elasticities of taxes (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Tanzania: elasticity of major taxes and of the total tax system, 1969-90 
Weight of tax in 
Elasticity 1989 (in per cent 
coefficient of total) R2 T-test D.W. 
1. Income tax 0.7589* 27.4089 0.9778 16.4764 1.8720® 
Company tax" 1.1349* 22.7680 0.9762 6.9175 1.4481s 
PAYEb 0.6601* 2.8337 0.9808 26.7683 1.8136 
2. Sales tax 0.7943* 31.6548 0.9800 16.0078 1.9105" 
3. Import duty 0.5518* 14.6460 0.5518 2.8641 2.2936s 
4. Total of (1)- (3) 73.7097 
5. Total tax system 0.7588* 100.0000 0.9778 16.4764 1.8720s 
Notes: * Coefficient significant at the 1% level. 
a Indicates use of the Cochrane-Orcutt process of adjustment for auto-correlation, 
b Estimation based on 1976-90 data since disaggregated data on company tax and PAYE 
were not available for the years before 1976. 
16 
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As discussed in the introduction, this paper considers the decomposition of 
income elasticity into tax-to-base elasticity and base-to-income elasticity. The 
proxy base taken for income taxes was non-agricultural GDP, and for company 
tax it was corporate profits. These profits are from parastatals and therefore 
exclude private corporations. The proxy base for PA YE (pay as you earn) was 
the wage bill. 
Since the type of sales tax levied in Tanzania was a manufacturing-level 
sales tax, manufacturing output was taken as a proxy base for the tax. Private 
final consumption would have been used as a proxy base if sales tax was 
levied at both wholesale and retail levels. Finally, the proxy base taken for 
import duties was imports (c.i.f). 
Data 
The data on tax revenues were obtained from Financial Statement and Revenue 
Estimates published by the Treasury. Estimates of discretionary tax changes 
were obtained from Budget Speeches, also a Treasury publication. Data on the 
wage bill and manufacturing output were from the Economic Survey, published 
by the Planning Commission. Corporate profits figures were from Parastatals 
Accounts, published by the Central Statistical Bureau. GDP figures were 
obtained from the National Accounts for Tanzania also published by the 
Central Statistical Bureau, and import figures were from Economic and 
Operation Report published by the Bank of Tanzania. 
Elasticity of the tax system 
Elasticities of the total tax system and of major taxes are presented in Table 
2. The elasticity of the total system was 0.76 over the 1969-90 period. 
Elasticities of individual taxes were rather divergent: the elasticity of sales tax, 
the bulwark of the system, was 0.79; income taxes had an elasticity of 0.91; 
company tax, and PA YE had elasticities of 1.13 and 0.66 respectively; and 
import duty had an elasticity of 0.55. 
Before analysing individual elasticities in detail certain points should be 
noted. 
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1 The overall elasticity of the tax system of 0.76 suggests that discretionary 
changes undertaken during the 1969-90 period failed to raise the ratio of 
tax to GDP. 
2. Sales tax, Tanzania's main source of revenue, had an elasticity below 
unity, owing possibly to generous exemptions and apparent tax evasion. 
Weak tax administration has also been a factor in contributing to a low 
elasticity coefficient of sales tax. 
3. Elasticity of income taxes was below unity. However, company tax 
exhibited an elasticity greater than unity and higher than that of income 
tax, while PA YE showed a much lower elasticity. 
4. Interpretation of the statistics R 2 for the total tax system and for individual 
taxes is important, since this statistic measures the extent to which changes 
in tax revenue are systematically correlated with changes in GDP. For total 
taxes, the level of R 2 is 0.98, indicating that the correlation is quite high. 
This finding is of some interest, as many aggregate economic models 
assume that tax revenues are functionally related to GDP (Mansfield, 1972, 
p. 435). The high level of R2 for total taxes in Tanzania would tend to bear 
out this assumption on purely statistical, as opposed to causative grounds. 
For all but import duty, the R2 is around 0.98, suggesting a good fit for the 
estimated equations. 
5. Where the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated the presence of auto-correlated 
disturbances, the iterative Cochrane-Orcutt process was used.6 This process 
results in an estimate with a smaller sampling variance than does the 
ordinary least-squares method, and also results in consistent estimation of 
Ihe error variance. 
Decomposition of elasticities 
It has been demonstrated that the elasticity of a given tax consists of two 
elements: the elasticity relative to the base (tax-to-base elasticity); and the 
elasticity of the base to income (base-to-income elasticity). Thus the income 
elasticity of a given tax is a product of tax-to-base and base-to-income 
elasticities. 
Since the legal base of each tax is not available, the yields of the five major 
types of taxes in Tanzania accounting for close to three-quarters of total tax 
revenue has been related to GDP. These relationships are summarized in Table 
2 and are discussed below. 
Table 2 Tanzania: decomposition of tax elasticities, 1979-89 
Tax-to-income Proxy base-to-income Tax-to-proxy base 
elasticity elasticity elasticity 
Tax and related proxy base Coefficient r 2 D.W. Coefficient r 2 D.W. Coefficient r 2 D.W. 
Income taxes and 
non-agricultural GDP 
Company tax and 
corporate profitsb 
PA YE and wage bill" 
Sales tax and 
manufacturing output 
Import duty and 
imports (c.i.f.) 
0.9158* 0.9812 2.06043 
1.1349* 0.9790 1.44813 
0.6601* 0.9821 1.8136 
0.7943 0.9800 1.91053 
0.5518* 0.5036 2.2936a 
0.8698* 0.9986 1.67223 
1.1170* 0.9085 1.91673 
0.4231* 0.9043 1.89213 
0.7083 0.9860 1.99353 
1.5923* 0.9704 1.54253 
1.0743* 0.9877 2.09673 
0.9006* 0.9012 2.0979 
1.5062* 0.9469 1.8333 
1.0171* 0.9724 1.5759s 
0.4367* 0.5469 1.6941 
Notes: * Coefficient significant at the 1% level. 
a Indicates use of the Cochrane-Orcutt process of adjustment for auto-correlation. 
b Estimation based on 1976-90 data since disaggregated data on company tax and PAYE were not available for the 
years before 1976. 
REVENUE PRODUCTIVITY IMPLICATIONS OF TAX REFORM IN TANZANIA 19 
Sales tax 
Sales tax brings in the bulk of sales tax revenue. It is levied on locally 
manufactured goods, imports and a few services: electricity, telephone and 
hotel services. However, the 1976 Sales Tax Act allows for exemption on all 
types of goods. It is interesting to note that the low elasticity of 0.79 for sales 
tax is a product of a relatively low base-to-income elasticity (0.71) and a 
relatively high tax-to-base elasticity (1.02). The former suggests that over the 
1969-90 period there has been slow growth in the sales tax base relative to 
growth in GDP. At the same time, tax collections have slightly accelerated in 
proportion to the growth of the tax base (manufacturing output). The low 
coefficient of tax-to-base elasticity (of around unity) probably reflects the 
combined effect of granting exemptions and inefficient tax administration. 
Nevertheless, the relative importance of these elements in depressing the 
coefficient would be difficult to ascertain. The R-2 statistic is relatively high for 
all three coefficients, suggesting that the function assumed is a good fit for the 
data. 
Import duties 
In theoiy, import charges are levied on all imports. In practice, however, 
exemptions for some capital goods, raw materials, and even consumer goods 
are generally granted by the import duty legislation. The elasticity of this tax 
was less than unity (0.55). Base-to-income elasticity (1.59) was higher than 
tax-to-base elasticity (0.43). The low tax-to-base elasticity seems to have been 
attributable to exemptions, tax evasion and poor overall tax administration. In 
contrast, the high base-to-income elasticity apparently reflects rapid growth in 
imports, in particular during the second half of the 1980s arising from trade 
liberalization initiated in 1984. The R2 statistic indicates a low relationship 
between tax collections and income. Nevertheless, the R2 is high for 
base-to-income elasticity equation. 
Company tax 
Company tax is the next most important to income tax, contributing over 
two-thirds of income tax revenue. According to the company tax legislation, 
the tax is levied on corporate profits, private and public. In 1989, parastatals 
accounted for 65.2% of total company taxes. Private corporate profits were 
excluded from the base for two reasons: access to them is difficult to obtain 
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and even if they are found, they may not be reliable. The elasticity of this tax 
was 1.13. The relatively low tax-to-base elasticity of 0.90 reflects weak tax 
administration and the existence of tax evasion. The relatively high base-to-
income elasticity of greater than unity suggests that corporate profits have been 
growing faster than GDP. The R 2 statistic is relatively high for all three 
equations, indicating that the function assumed is a good fit for the data. 
PAYE 
PA YE (pay as you earn) shows an interesting pattern in that the wage bill 
grew much less slowly than income (with a base-to-income elasticity of 0.42), 
but the tax-to-base elasticity was considerably higher (1.51). The income 
elasticity of less than unity (0.66) is a product of a high tax-to-base elasticity 
and a low base-to-income elasticity. The low base-to-income elasticity reflects 
slow growth in the wage bill in relation to GDP; the level of pay has been far 
below the living wage since the beginning of the last decade. A high 
tax-to-base elasticity might be explained by the imposition of very high 
marginal rates, and the fact that PAYE is the tax with possibly the highest 
compliance since it is deducted at source. Nevertheless, this high coefficient 
is offset by a considerably lower base-to-income elasticity coefficient, the 
product of which is an income elasticity of 0.66. The Ft2 statistic is high for all 
three equations. 
Income taxes 
The income elasticity of income taxes was less than unity. This is a product 
of low base-to-income elasticity (0.87) and tax-to-base elasticity of around 
unity. Thus, a relatively low base-to-income elasticity suggests that monetary 
GDP has grown less in proportion to GDP. The marginally elastic tax-to-base 
elasticity reflects net ineffective tax collection arising from weak tax 
administration. The IT2 statistics are quite high for all coefficients suggesting 
a good fit for the data. 
Summary of decomposition analysis 
Analysis of the components of the overall tax elasticities emphasizes the 
generally low value of the base-to-income relative to tax-to-base elasticities as 
key factors in explaining the fairly low elasticity of the tax system. If the 
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collection of income tax, sales tax and PA YE had grown relative to their 
respective bases, overall elasticities would have been much higher. Tax-to-base 
elasticities can be improved through better tax administration (in the narrow 
sense of more efficient procedures), minimization of tax evasion, reduction or 
abolition of exemptions, and use of ad valorem rates to increase revenue as the 
value of the base rises. The tax-to-base constituent of elasticity is, therefore, 
partly within the control of the authorities. 
In contrast, the enhancement of the base-to-income elasticity, that is the 
growth of the tax base, lies outside the control of the authorities (apart from 
the influence of tax policy itself). In general, growth in the tax base is mainly 
determined by the way the structure of the economy changes with economic 
growth. In designing income-elastic taxes, both the predicted response of that 
tax base to income, and the potential for an effective and/or improved level of 
administration, should be considered (Mansfield, 1972, p.427). 
Tax buoyancy versus tax elasticity 
As in the case of elasticity, the buoyancy coefficient has been estimated from 
a double log function implying the original form 
T = a Yhk 
The difference between tax-to-income elasticity and tax buoyancy shows the 
importance of discretionary changes, while a tax-by-tax comparison of the two 
measures points to the taxes for which discretionary changes are most 
important. 
As shown in Table 3, the tax system as a whole had a buoyancy of 1.06 
against elasticity of 0.76. The major cause of growth of total tax revenue can 
be seen to lie in discretionary changes, particularly the increase in tax rates 
over the period. 
Income taxes, like total taxes, exhibited a buoyancy coefficient exceeding the 
elasticity coefficient. This suggests that discretionary changes were responsible 
for the growth of income tax revenue over the period. The buoyancy and 
elasticity coefficients relating to company tax were the same. This was because 
company tax rates had remained the same over the period, in the same way, 
the difference between buoyancy and elasticity relating to PA YE was zero. 
There were changes in PA YE marginal rates in 1986 and 1989. However, they 
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were mainly aimed at raising the take-home pay of the worker, as opposed to 
increasing tax collections. 
For sales tax, buoyancy was larger than elasticity, which again suggested that 
discretionary changes were responsible for the growth in yield (over the period 
examined). In contrast, import duty, the Jeast elastic tax, exhibited the greatest 
difference between buoyancy and elasticity. The major cause for the growth 
of import duty revenues lies in discretionary changes, particularly the increases 
in tax rates over the period, and the rationalization of import duty rates, and 
rate categories. 
Table 3 Tanzania: difference between tax buoyancy and elasticity for 
total tax and selected major taxes, 1969-90 
Difference (in 
Buoyancy Elasticity percentage points) 
Total taxes 1.0602 0.7588 0.3014 
Income taxes 0.0397 0.9158 0.1239 
Company taxes 1.1349 1.1349 0.0000 
PAYE 0.6601 0.6601 0.0000 
Sales tax 0.8961 0.7943 0.1018 
Import duty 1.0843 0.5518 0.5325 
V Tax exemptions and elasticities 
Exemptions 
One major weakness of the Tanzanian tax system is that it allows for 
numerous and generous exemptions. Most of these exemptions apply to 
indirect taxes (excise duties, import duties and sales tax). Nevertheless, 
exemptions also extend to direct taxes. 
Zero- rating is one form of exemption in Tanzania. In the case of sales tax it 
applies to basic foods: it aims to improve the distribution of tax and help to 
minimize the cascading in the processed food industry. Apart from food, zero 
rating applies to certain industrial inputs and machinery, yet it does not cover 
others, like industrial chemicals, office equipment and supplies. The major flaw 
of this approach is that some goods, which were exempted because they are 
productive inputs, can also be legally used for other purposes, but still evade 
tax. Thus, there is a consequent loss of revenue while the benefits of such 
exemptions spill over to unintended beneficiaries. 
According to Section 7 of the 1976 Customs Tariff Act, the Minister of 
Finance has discretionary powers to exempt goods and individuals from full 
or partial payment of duty. Further, his discretionary power also extends to 
modifying Parts A and B of the Third Schedule. For all practical purposes, the 
Minister has discretionary power over all exemptions. 
Part A of the Third Schedule to the 1976 Customs Tariff Act lists 17 bodies 
entitled to exemption from duty, such as government, diplomatic, international 
and religious bodies. Part B lists 24 general exemptions including aircraft 
operations, passengers' luggage, containers, printed matter, industrial sewing 
machines, ship accessories, educational articles and materials. 
The discretionary exemptions under Section, 7 are not listed, but the 
discretionary power is conferred on the Minister of Finance. The coverage is 
not explicit, but seems to include exemptions on a case-by-case basis: partial 
exemptions are granted accor <o the Minister's assessment of desirability, 
to parastatal institutions an*1 ^uufacturers. Between 1981 and 1988 the 
Minister allowed duly to be by instalment, but this was without legal 
authority, the Sales Tax Act d • «- permit payment in this way. The position 
was legalised in July 1988, B "P0, out of a total postponement of Tsh 49.5 
million in duty since 1981, o«<, fsn 7.9 million (or 16%) of the total has been 
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paid. At present not less than 82 importers enjoy some postponement of duty 
payment. 
Table 4 shows taxes paid and exemptions granted on imports cleared through 
customs. In 1989 exempted imports were about 58% of fully taxed imports and 
about 37% of total imports. Taxes forgone through exemptions registered Tsh 
23,572.3 or 16.9%, 26.7% and 46.2% of total imports, fully taxed imports and 
exempted imports, respectively. Of exempted taxes, parastatal exemptions 
constituted 34.1%, government exemptions 19.7%, religious organisations/ 
bodies 10.6%, private exemptions 8.2%, and the rest 27.4%. Further, import 
duties and sales tax accounted for 48.8%, respectively. 
Total taxes paid constituted 20.1% of fully taxed imports, 16.9% of exempted 
imports, and 13.5% of total imports. On the basis of granting exemptions on 
imports, in 1989 the effective rate of taxes on imports was only 13.5%. This 
is rather low when compared with the maximum import duty rate of 60%, and 
maximum sales tax rate of 50% which were applicable in 1989. The large 
number of exemptions have had a marked affect on tax collections. 
Exemptions and elasticities 
The discussion of exemptions is important since they have a significant impact 
on the effective tax base. The provision of generous exemptions often tends to 
erode the tax base which, in turn, affects income elasticity of a tax through 
tax-to-base elasticity. In the previous section, sales tax was found to have a 
low elasticity of 0.73. This was argued to be a product of a high 
base-to-income elasticity of 1.26 and a low tax-to-base elasticity of 0.53. This 
implies that the base of sales tax grew faster than that of GDP, while tax 
collections grew much more slowly than the base, possibly due to exemptions 
granted. Thus these exemptions seem to have been responsible for offsetting 
the fast growth of the sales tax base (over the 1979-89 period), thereby 
depressing the income elasticity of the tax. 
Import duties also exhibited an elasticity less than unity (0.80). Such a low 
elasticity was a product of a high base-to-income and low tax-to-base 
elasticity. Exemptions seem to have lowered the income elasticity of import 
duties through depressing tax-to-base elasticity. 
In the case of income taxes, figures on exemptions are not available because 
the 1973 Income Tax Act does not legally require the exempted taxpayer to 
file a return: the Income Tax Department has no knowledge of the amounts of 
tax forgone through exemption. In view of this, it is impossible to relate 
elasticities of income taxes to exemptions in the absence of relevant data. 
REVENUE PRODUCTIVITY IMPLICATIONS OF TAX REFORM IN TANZANIA 34 
Table 4 Tanzania: taxes paid and exemptions granted on 
goods cleared through customs, 1989 (in millions 
Tsh) 
Fully 
taxed 
imports 
Exempted 
imports 
Total 
imports 
Value 88,247.9 50,970.3 139,245.2 
Taxes paid 
Import duty 
Sales tax 
Excise duty 
17,769.8 
10,224.7 
7,110.4 
434.7 
958.6 
781.8 
173.8 
3.0 
18.728.4 
11.606.5 
7,284.2 
437.7 
Taxes exempted 
Import duty 
Sales tax 
Excise duty 646.5 
23,572.3 
11,410.2 
11,515.6 
646.5 
23,572.3 
11,410.2 
11,515.6 
Taxes paid plus 
exemptions granted 
17,769.8 24,530.9 42,300.7 
Exemptions as 
percentage of value 
26.7 
* 
46.2 16.9 
Exemptions as 
percentage of 
potential taxes * 
100.0 96.1 55.7 
Taxes paid as 
percentage of 
taxes exempted * 
4.1 79.5 
Taxes paid as 
percentage of value 
20.1 
* 
1.9 13.5 
Note: * Percentages computed by author. 
Source: Customs and Sates Tax Department. 
VI Conclusion 
In recent years tax reform has turned from a desired or preferred task to being 
a necessary one. The poor performance of revenue sources in generating 
adequate revenues has created the need for tax reforms in many developing 
countries. Since the end of the 1960s, the tax system of Tanzania has 
undergone fundamental reforms. In general, these have largely aimed at raising 
revenue to match rapidly growing fiscal spending. Tax reform has been used 
as an instrument of raising the revenue productivity of the tax system. 
Estimates of income elasticities of individual taxes and total taxes, based on 
empirical evidence, suggests that tax reform has, nevertheless, failed to raise 
the revenue productivity. This is reflected in elasticities less than unity for the 
major taxes and total tax system. However, all taxes (including the total tax 
system), except company tax and PA YE, had a buoyancy coefficient greater 
than elasticity coefficient, indicating that discretionary changes were important 
in raising tax revenues. Discretionary changes were most needed in the 
collection of import duties, income taxes, and sales tax, in that order 
The failure of tax reform to improve the revenue productivity of the tax 
system seems to have been caused by granting generous exemptions and poor 
tax administration. Exemptions have particularly reduced the effective base of 
income taxes, PA YE, and sales tax. 
The empirical results in this study have important implications for tax 
reform. An elastic tax structure is appropriate in a developing economy 
because it implies that tax collections will grow automatically with growing 
income without the need to resort to any politically sensitive increase in tax 
rates (Due, 1981, p. 550). Since elasticity is an important element of taxation 
in a developing economy, the authorities must be able to identify those taxes 
which are elastic and those which are not. To raise the overall elasticity of the 
tax system requires focusing on those taxes which are most income elastic. 
For income taxes, PA YE and sales tax, for which tax-to-base elasticity 
coefficients are lower than base-to-income elasticity coefficients, the income 
elasticities of the respective taxes and the overall tax system would have been 
much higher had their respective bases grown at least at the same rate or 
higher than growth of GDP. This paper has argued above that the generally 
low tax-to-base elasticities seem to have been a result of poor tax 
administration combined with the existence of generous exemptions. 
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Accordingly, the authorities should direct tax reform towards improving 
administration and reducing, or totally eliminating, tax exemptions, which often 
erode the effective tax base. 
In the case of those taxes with a base-to-income elasticity coefficient lower 
than unity (income taxes, sales tax and PAYE), there is very little leeway for 
the authorities to improve these coefficients since the growth of the tax base 
is outside their control. Nevertheless, the only option the government may 
utilize to broaden the tax base is to reduce or eliminate tax exemptions on 
income taxes and sales tax. Finally, should the authorities in Tanzania wish to 
design income-elastic taxes, apart from improving the level of administration 
and reducing or eliminating exemptions, the predicted response of tax base to 
income must be seriously considered. 
Appendix 
Appendix Table 1 Tanzania: central 
government tax revenues (as 
percentage of GDP) 
1979 21.1 1985 18.5 
1980 21.7 1986 20.9 
1981 21.0 1987 22.0 
1982 21.2 1988 23.8 
1983 21.8 1989 23.3 
1984 22.2 
Source: Computed using data obtained from 
Financial Statements and Revenue 
Estimates, Vol. 1, various years, National 
Accounts of Tanzania (1976-89) and Hali ya 
Uchumi was Taifa (1982) and (1990) issues. 
Appendix Table 2 Central governments of ASEAN: tax 
revenues (as percentage of GDP) 
A T 
Indonesia 20.58 16.4 
Malaysia 22.70 17.8 
Philippines 11.02 13.3 
Singapore 19.60 13.1 
Thailand 13.60 15.2 
Notes: A Average of 1981 to 1985 
T Terminal year. 1987 for the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand; and 1988 for Indonesia and 
Malaysia. 
Source: Asher, Mukul G. (ed.), 1989, in Fiscal Systems and 
Practices in ASEAN: Trends, Impact and Evaluation, 
Singapore, Institute of Southern Asian Studies, Table 1.1, 
p. 5. 
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Appendix Table 3 Tax revenues as 
percentage of GDP, 1985* 
Sweden 50.5 
Denmark 48.5 
France 45.6 
Netherlands 44.9 
United Kingdom 38.1 
Germany 37.1 
Italy 34.7 
Canada 33.2 
Australia 30.4 
United States 29.2 
Japan 28.0 
Notes: * Includes national and local taxes 
Source: World Tax Reform: a Progress 
Report. 
Appendix Table 4 Tanzania: revenue effects of discretionary tax changes, 1979-89 (in millions of shillings) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Income tax 
Amendment of income legislation 
Introduction of pay roll levy 
Strengthening of tax administration 
and collection 
Sales tax 
Increase in rates 
Revision of taxable of sugar 
Broadening tax base 
Strengthening tax administration 
and collection 
Rationalization of tax administration 
and simplification of rates 
Import duty 
Increase in rates 
Removal of exemptions 
Strengthening tax administration 
and collection 
Rationalization of customs tariff 
structure (base and rate) 
500 
174 490 282 655 797 
100 
198 
587 2093 251 
60 
3400 
806 587 
25 
1383 
430 
35 
177 
345 80 10 255 47 
517 
-350 
continued ... 
Appendix Table 4 cont... 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
15 
Stamp duty 
Increase in rates 
Abolition of stamp duty 
Strengthening of tax administration 
and collection 
Others* 
Increase in rates 
Introduction of new taxes (road 
toll, foreign travel levy, and cassette 
rental tax) 
Reintroduction of previously 
abolished taxes (road licence and excise duty) 
Broadening tax base (increase in toll 
stations) 
500 
374 
20 
20 
-30 
- 1 0 
198 
450 
10 34 7 30 137 45 603 
67 15 
1649 
30 5 156 545 
Note:* Others include export tax, motor vide taxes and licences, foreign travel levy, airport departure tax, video cassette rental tax, land 
rent tax, hotel levy and business licences. 
Source: Budget Speech for fiscal years 1979/80-1989/90. 
Notes 
1. The relatively high tax to GDP ratio should be interpreted with caution 
since in Tanzania GDP figures are likely to be under-estimated. The 
possible under-estimation arises because the underground economy, which 
is argued to be quite significant, is not taken into account. 
2. For the US see Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, Ch. 12). For evidence on 
the relative roles of the tax and expenditure sides of the budget in income 
redistribution in LDCs, see (for Chile) Foxley, Aminat and Arrallaw (1979, 
Ch. 6) for Colombia, Selowsky (1979, Ch.l) and for Malaysia, Snodgrass, 
1974. 
3. The married allowance for a spouse was Tsh 60, and child allowance was 
Tsh 10 per child, applicable up to four children. Thus a married person with 
four children received a total married and child allowance of Tsh 100. This 
amount of money is meaningless today. At the current exchange rate, it is 
equivalent to US$0.43. 
4. For a detailed discussion see the 1976 Sales Tax Act. 
5. This method was first used by Prest, 1962. A formally comparable method 
was used by Sahota, 1961. 
6. See Johnston, 1984, and Cochrane and Orcutt, 1949. 
References 
Asher, M.G., 1989a, 'Tax reforms in East Asian developing countries: 
motivations, directions and implications', Asian-Pacific Economic 
Literature, 3, No. 2, March, 39-63. 
(ed.), 1989b, Fiscal Systems and Practices in Asean: Trends, Impact and 
Evaluation, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Bird, R.M., 1990, 'Tax administration and tax reform: reflections on 
experience', in Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and Shah (eds), 1990, Tax Policy in 
Developing Countries, Washington DC, Ch. 4. 
Buchanan, J.M., 1987, 'Tax reform and political choice', Journal of 
Economic Perspective, 1, No. 1, November, 29-35. 
Byrne, W.I., 1983, 'The elasticity of the tax system of Zambia', World 
Development, 11, No. 2, 153-62. 
Cochrane, D. and G.H. Orcutt, 1949, 'Application of least squares 
regressions to relationships containing autocorrelated error Terms', Journal 
of the American Statistical Association, 44, 32-61. 
Due, J.F., 1981, Government Finance, Homewood, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 550. 
Gillis, M., 1985, 'Micro and macroeconomics of tax reform: Indonesia', 
Journal of Development Economics, 19, No. 3, 221-254. 
1989a, 'Toward a taxonomy for tax reform', in M. Gillis (ed.) Tax Reform 
in Developing Countries, 7-26. 
1989b, 'Lessons from post-war experiences in developing nations' in M. 
Gillis (ed.), Tax Reform in Developing Countries: 492-520. 
Goode, R., 1987, 'Implementing tax reform in sub-Saharan Africa' in Tax 
Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa Papers and Proceedings, Bureau for Africa 
Agency for International Development, October 29-30, 2-34. 
Johnston, J., 1984, Econometric Methods, 3rd edn, McGraw-Hill: New York, 
304-30. 
Khalilzadeh-Shirazi, J. and A. Shah (eds), 1990, Tax Policy in Developing 
Countries, A World Bank Symposium, Washington. 
Leuthold, J.H. and T. N'Guessan, 1986, 'Tax buoyancy and elasticity in a 
developing economy', Bureau of Economics and Business Research Faculty 
Working Paper, No. 1272, University of Illinois.Urbana-Champaign. 
34 RESEARCH PAPER 2 0 
Mansfield, C.Y., 1972, 'Elasticity and buoyancy of tax system', International 
Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 29, July, 425-40. 
McLure, C.E., 1990, 'Appraising tax reform', in M.J. Boskin and C.E. 
McLure (eds) World Tax Reform: Case Studies of Developed and 
Developing Countries, International Centre for Economic Growth: 
California, 279-88. 
McMahon, G. and M. Berrios, 1991, 'Tax reform and macroeconomic Policy 
in Developing Countries'. 
Musgrave, R.A. and P.B. Musgrave, 1984, Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice, McGraw-Hill: New York, Ch. 4. 
Newberry, D. and N. Stern (eds), 1987, The Theory of Taxation in Developing 
Countries, Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Osoro, N.E., 1985, The Buoyancy and Elasticity of the Tanzania Tax 
Structure: 1969/70-1980/81, Ph.D. thesis presented to University of Illinois, 
Urbana-Champaign. 
Prest, A.R. 'The Sensitivity of Yield of Personal Income Tax in the United 
Kingdom', Economic Journal, 52, September, 576-96. 
Sahota, G.S., 1961, Indian Tax Structure and Economic Development, Asia 
Publishing House: London. 
Singer, N.M., 1968, 'The use of dummy variables in estimating the income 
elasticity of state income tax revenues', National Tax Journal, 21, June, 
200-4. 
Tanzi, V. and P. Shome, 1990, "The role of taxation in the development of 
East Asian economies', paper presented at a Conference on the Political 
Economy and their Implications for Interdependence, June 14-16, Seoul, 
Korea. 
United Republic of Tanzania, various years, Budget Speech by the Minister 
for Finance, Government Printer: Dar-es-Salaam. 
— various years, Economic Survey, Government Printer: Dar-es-Salaam. 
— various years, Financial Statement and Revenue Estimates, Government 
Printer: Dar-es-Salaam, Vol. 1. 
— 1969, Sales Tax Act, Government Printer: Dar-es-Salaam. 
— 1973, Income Tax Act, Government Printer: Dar-es-Salaam. 
— 1976, Customs Tariff Act, Government Printer: Dar-es-Salaam. 
— 1976, Sales Tax Act, Government Printer: Dar-es-Salaam. 
— 1989, National Accounts of Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics: Dar-es-Salaam. 
AFRICAN E C O N O M I C R E S E A R C H C O N S O R T I U M 
AERC 
CREA 
P. O. BOX 62882 
NAIROBI KENYA 
TELEPHONE (254-2) 228057 225234 
215898 212359 332438 225087 
TELEX 22480 
FAX (254-2) 219308 
ry? 
I h e principal objective of the African Economic Research 
Consortium (AERC), established in August 1988, is to 
strengthen local capacity for conducting independent, 
rigourous inquiry into problems pertinent to the manage-
ment of economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In response to special needs of the region, AERC has 
adopted a flexible approach to improve the technical skills 
of local researchers, allow for regional determination of 
research priorities, strengthen national institutions con-
cerned with economic policy research, and facilitate closer 
ties between researchers and policymakers. 
Since its establishment, AERC has been supported by pri-
vate foundations, bilateral aid agencies and international 
organizations. 
SPECIAL PAPERS contain the findings of commissioned 
studies in furtherance of AERC's programmes for research, 
training and capacity building. 
RESEARCH PAPERS contain the edited and externally 
reviewed results of research financed by the AERC. 
It is AERC's policy that authors of Special and Research 
Papers are free to use material contained therein in other 
publications. Views expressed in the Special and Research 
Papers are those of the authors alone and should not be 
attributed to the AERC's sponsoring Members, Advisory 
Committee, or Secretariat. 
Further information concerning the AERC and addi-
tional copies of Special and Research Papers can be obtained 
by writing to: African Economic Research Consortium, P.O. 
BOX62882, Nairobi, Kenya. 
V 
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons 
Attribution - Noncommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
